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Have the Amendments to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act Razed Rowley and Raised the
Substantive Standard for "Free Appropriate Public
Education?"
By Perry A. Zirkel*
ABSTRACT
After recapping the substantive standard for free appropriate public
education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) first spelled out in Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(1982), this article traces recent legal commentators' advocacy for
elevating this FAPE standard based on the changed statutory context of
the 1997 and-punctuated by the NCLB in 2001-the 2004
reauthorizations of IDEA, followed by the corresponding case law that
has largely negated such advocacy in the absence of more specific
amendments. The missing link, which the previous commentators and
case law have largely failed to address, may be the provision in IDEA
2004 requiring that the IEP statement of special education and related
services be based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable.
After canvassing the initial hearing officer and court applications of
PRR, which provide limited support for a heightened standard, the
article ends with a discussion of the implications of this new provision
for special education practice, litigation, and policymaking.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)1 dates
back to 1975, when Congress passed the first version of this funding
* Perry A. Zirkel is university professor of education and law at Lehigh
University, where he formerly was dean of the College of Education and more
recently held the Iacocca Chair in Education. He has a Ph.D. in Educational
Administration, a J.D. from the University of Connecticut, and a Master of Laws
degree from Yale University. He has written more than 1,150 publications on
various aspects of school law, with an emphasis on legal issues in special
education. Past president of the Education Law Association and co-chair of the
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legislation for special education.2 IDEA was passed two years after the
enactment of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,3 a civil rights
statute prohibiting disability discrimination.4 The central obligation
under IDEA is the provision for "free appropriate public education,"5
via an individualized education program,6 to each student with a
disability.7 The adjudicative dispute resolution system under IDEA
starts with an impartial due process hearing, provides each state with
Pennsylvania special education appeals panel from 1990 to 2006. He writes a
regular column in Phi Delta Kappan, another for Principal magazine, and a third,
more recently, for Teaching Exceptional Children. Past president of the Education
Law Association and co-chair of the Pennsylvania special education appeals panel
from 1990 to 2006, he is the author of the two-volume reference Section 504, the
ADA, and the Schools, and the recent CEC monograph The Legal Meaning of
Specific Learning Disability.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000).
2. The successive reauthorizations included the 1986 amendments, Education
of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99 §457, 100 Stat. 1145
(1986) (amended 1990), which included attorneys' fees for prevailing parents; the
1990 amendments, Education of the handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101 §476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (amended 1991), which provided, inter
alia, the IDEA as the new name for the original Education of the Handicapped Act;
the 1997 amendments, Individuals with Disabilities Act Amendments of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105 §17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (amended 2004), which included major
provisions for discipline of students with disabilities; and the most recent 2004
amendments, Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108, §446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004), which included fine-tuning to
several provisions of the Act.
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 705(20), 794, 794a (2000); see generally PERRY A. ZIRKEL,
SECTION 504, THE ADA AND THE SCHOOLS (2004) (a comprehensive reference that
includes the interrelated Americans with Disabilities Act).
4. See generally Perry A. Zirkel, An Updated Comparison of the IDEA and
Section 504/ADA, 216 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2007) (a systematic canvassing of the
similarities and differences between IDEA and Section 504 of the ADA).
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2008). See, e.g., Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20,
538 F.3d 1306, 1312 (10th Cir. 2008) (characterized FAPE as "the central pillar of
the IDEA statutory structure").
6. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d) (2005). See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S.
305, 311 (1988) (characterizing the IEP as "the primary vehicle" of the IDEA).
7. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(3), 1412(a)(1)(A) (2005).
the option of a second review officer tier, and then provides concurrent
jurisdiction for judicial review via state and federal courts. 8
Special education, akin to the military, is full of specialized terms,
including a bewildering array of acronyms. Many of them have legal
significance under IDEA. Although this author has endeavored to limit
the use of acronyms, here is an introductory glossary as a quick
reference of those appearing in this Article:
- AYP (adequate yearly progress): the metric that the NCLB
requires for holding schools and school districts accountable in
terms of their student populations overall, and four
disaggregated subgroups in particular (i.e., students with
disabilities, limited English proficient students, economically
disadvantaged students, and minority students)
- FAPE (free appropriate public education): the central IDEA
obligation of school districts to students with disabilities
- IDEA 97 and IDEA 2004: the 1997 and 2004 amendments to
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
- IEP (individualized education program): the document that
specifies the FAPE for the individual eligible student, including,
for example, measurable goals, specially designed instruction,
related services, and, for a child sixteen years or more in age, a
transition plan for postsecondary employment or education
- LRE (least restrictive environment): the interrelated IDEA
mandate that school districts maximize the interaction of each
eligible student with nondisabled students
- NCLB (No Child Left Behind Act): the 2001 funding
legislation that included a wide variety of K-12 educational
8. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)-(1) (2005). The trend at the administrative level of this
hierarchy has been a marked increase in single tier systems of full-time
administrative law judges, although there continues to be marked variety among the
states. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha & Anastasia D'Angelo, The
Creeping Judicialization of Special Education Hearings: An Exploratory Study, 27
J. NAALJ 27 (2007).
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reforms, including accountability measures for public schools
and school districts
- OSEP (U.S. Office of Special Education Programs): the part
of the USDE that administers the IDEA
- PRR (peer-reviewed research): a term used in the prescribed
IEP ingredients under IDEA that is associated with research,
whether scientifically based or not, that experts have approved
as worthy of dissemination
- SBR (scientifically based research): a term defined in the
NCLB and imported into IDEA 2004 for specified permissive
and mandatory applications
- SEA (state education agency): used in citations herein to
designate hearing or review officer decisions
- USDE (U.S. Department of Education): the administrative
agency for the various federal education laws
The purpose of this Article is to describe, not prescribe, the
evolving answer to the question of whether a new, significantly
elevated substantive standard of FAPE applies in place of Board of
Education v. Rowley as a result of the successive changes in IDEA 97
and-punctuated by the NCLB-IDEA 2004. The analysis is
divided into five successive parts. Part I provides an overview of the
Supreme Court's first and foremost IDEA decision, Rowley, in terms
of its interpretation of the meaning of FAPE, with special attention to
its substantive standard. Part II summarizes the pertinent scholarly
commentary in the overlapping literatures of special education and
education law. Part III canvasses the case law that addresses the
broad changes in the language of IDEA 97, the NCLB, and IDEA
2004. Part IV focuses specifically on the PRR provision of IDEA
2004. Part V analyzes the seeming "Y" in the road represented by
hearing officer and court decisions in Iowa and California,
respectively. The conclusion discusses the implications in terms of
practice, litigation, and policymaking.
I.THE ROWLEY SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD FOR FAPE
In 1982, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its
landmark IDEA decision in Board of Education v. Rowley 9 to
interpret the meaning of FAPE. The Rowley court concluded that
because the primary purpose of the Act was to provide access to
public schools generally and special education specifically, the
meaning of FAPE was primarily procedural. The Court, however,
further held that the residual, substantive standard was that the IEP be
"reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits."' 10 In reaching this substantive standard, the Court rejected
the higher standards of commensurate opportunity," self-
sufficiency, 12 and maximization.' 3 Moreover, the majority instructed
lower courts to apply this standard with deference to school
authorities. "4  In dissent, Justice White pointed out that this
9. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). See generally, Perry A.
Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from Board of Education v. Rowley:
Razing the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 MD. L. REv. 466 (1983) (one of the
many proximate analyses).
10. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
11. Id. at 189-90. As the dissenting opinion in the lower appellate court's
decision pointed out, the commensurate opportunity standard is associated with
Section 504, not IDEA. Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1980).
For a brief comparative analysis, see Perry A. Zirkel, The Substantive Standard for
FAPE: Does Section 504 Require Less Than the IDEA?, 106 EDUC. L. REP. 471
(1996).
12. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201 n.23.
13. Id. at 204 n.26. At the same time, however, the majority disclaimed
attempting "to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational
benefits conferred upon all the children covered by the Act," expressly limiting its
analysis to the single situation of "a handicapped child who is receiving substantial
specialized instruction and related services, and who is performing above average
in the regular classrooms of a public school system." Id. at 202.
14. Id. at 207 (footnote omitted).
In assuring that the requirements of the Act have been met, courts
must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable
educational methods upon the States. The primary responsibility
for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child,
and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the
child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational
agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child.
Id.
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substantive standard and its deferential application establish a low
floor of opportunity. Indeed, in light of Amy Rowley being a child
with a hearing impairment, the dissent observed: "[i]t would
apparently satisfy the Court's standard of 'access to specialized
instruction and related services which are individually designed to
provide educational benefit to the handicapped child,' for a deaf child
such as Amy to be given [merely] a teacher with a loud voice."' 5
In the next 25 years, the hundreds of court decisions concerning
the substantive standard of FAPE'6 have provided varying qualifiers
as to the extent of educational benefit,17 but none of the variations in
the Rowley progeny came close to the maximization or even
commensurate opportunity or self-sufficiency standards that the
Rowley Court had rejected. 18 Moreover, during the same period, the
relatively few states that had adopted in their special education laws a
higher substantive standard for FAPE dwindled rather than
expanded.' 9 For example, Massachusetts eliminated the maximum
15. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting). The three Justices subscribing to the
dissent ignored the majority's narrow boundaries for its substantive holding,
perhaps foreseeing the future failure of lower courts to heed the same. Idat 202,
204.
16. Huefner reported that 1,095 lower court decisions have cited the Rowley
Court's decision, but obviously several of these citations have not been specific to
the substantive standard for FAPE. Dixie Snow Huefner, Updating the FAPE
Standard under Rowley, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 367, 367 (2008).
17. FAPE is the most litigated issue under IDEA. For a broad selection of the
long line of post-Rowley lower court FAPE decisions, see, for example, the nine
successive "Special Education Law Updates" in 206 EDUC. L. REP. 501; 183 EDUC.
L. REP. 35 (2004); 160 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2002); 133 EDUC. L. REP. 323 (1999); 116
EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1997); 98 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1995); 83 EDUC. L. REP. 543 (1993);
66 EDUC. L. REP. 901 (1991); and 56 EDUC. L. REP. 20 (1990). See also Andrea
Blau, The IDEA and the Right to an "Appropriate" Education, 2007 BYU EDUC.
& L.J. 1, 19-22 (2007), and Philip T.K. Daniel & Jill Meinhardt, Valuing the
Education of Students with Disabilities: Has Government Legislation Caused a
Reinterpretation of Free Appropriate Public Education?, 222 EDUC. L. REP. 515,
519-21 (2007) (providing an overview of the variations of the substantive
standard).
18. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. For the most part, they also
regarded the Rowley ruling as much more generalizeable than the majority
circumscribed. See supra note 15.
19. See, e.g., DIXIE SNOW HUEFNER, GETTING COMFORTABLE WITH SPECIAL
EDUCATION LAW 250 (2006) (additionally citing Arkansas, Iowa, and New Jersey);
benefit standard in favor of the IDEA Rowley standard, resulting in
less parent-friendly outcomes in recent case law than under its
previous state law. 20  Furthermore, although Michigan retained its
"maximum potential" standard, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
has interpreted it as more hortatory than mandatory, thus not equating
to the best possible education.
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II.SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY
During the past decade, various commentators in the special
education and the legal literatures have advocated a higher
substantive standard for FAPE in light of the successive and
relatively recent post-Rowley developments in federal legislation-
specifically, the broad-based references in IDEA 1997 and IDEA
2004 to the goal of self-sufficiency, the increased importance of
outcomes, and the emphasis on access to the general curriculum 22 as
well as the intervening passage of the NCLB in 2001.23 Yet, at the
same time, Congress did not change the definition of FAPE that the
Rowley Court has used as its framework.
The special education law specialists, at least those without legal
training in the special education literature have unfortunately, 24 but
understandably, 25 tended toward fusing their professional norms of
MITCHELL YELL, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 20 (2006) (reporting that Arkansas and
Iowa amended their state laws to conform to the federal standard).
20. Compare Parents of Danielle v. Mass. Bd. of Educ., 430 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.
Mass. 2006), with Frank S. v. Sch. Comm., 26 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. Mass. 1998).
21. See, e.g., Renner v. Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1999).
22. The commentators are correct to the notable extent that the Rowley Court
relied on the preamble, or findings, section of the Act and that Congress changed
these introductory provisions in the 1997 and 2004 amendments.
23. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2008); see also Perry A. Zirkel, NCLB: What Does It
Mean for Students with Disabilities?, 185 EDUC. L. REP. 805 (2004) (providing the
intersections between the NCLB and IDEA).
24. This tendency is unfortunate because special education practitioners tend to
rely on the special education literature rather than the overlapping education law
literature, thus proliferating confusion between what is the legal minimum and the
professional optimum. This confusion may lead to litigation. See, e.g., Perry A.
Zirkel & Robert L. Suppa, Legal-Ethical Conflicts for Educator-Advocates of
Handicapped Students, 35 EDUC. L. REP. 9 (1985).
25. The tendency is understandable because one of the ethical norms of special
educators is to engage in advocacy. Yet, while commenting that "special educators
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best practice (or what should be) with the more minimum focus of
legal requirements (or what shall be). As the leading Rowley-related
example, 26 Yell, Katsiyannis, and Hazelkorn interpreted the "plain
meaning" of the intervening changes in IDEA 1997 and IDEA 2004
as leading to "a fundamental alteration in the ways in which the
courts view a FAPE. '27
In the legal literature, the commentators have been more careful
to separate description from prescription and, for the most part, more
tempered in their advocacy. On the less tempered side, Eyer
balanced the congressional acquiescence to Rowley with the
emphasis on outcomes in IDEA 1997, to posit a heightened benefit
standard: "reasonably calculated to confer measurable educational
progress based on the general education curriculum." 28  Similarly,
after the passage of the NCLB, Johnson started with the same
premise: "[t]he 1997 amendments to the IDEA make clear that the
have what we consider a duty to champion understanding of individuals with
disabilities and provision of beneficial services for them," Lloyd and Hallahan
condition such advocacy on a basis in "empirical evidence." John Wills Lloyd &
Daniel P. Hallahan, Advocacy and Reform of Special Education, in ACHIEVING THE
RADICAL REFORM OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 245, 248 & 258 (Jean B. Crockett, et al
eds., 2007).
26. For examples of other IDEA contexts, see YELL, supra note 19, at 299
(characterizing IDEA IEP provisions as requiring a FBA and a BIP when the
student has behavioral problems); Linda L. Meloy, Minimalist Approach to
Manifestation Determination: Possible Compromise of Due Process Rights, 36
COMMUNIQUL' 8 (March 2008) (proposing that compliance with IDEA was
violation of students' due process rights).
27. Mitchell L. Yell, Antonis Katsiyannis & Michael Hazelkorn, Reflections of
the 25th Anniversary of the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Board of Education
v. Rowley, 39 FOCUS ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 1, 9 (2007). In making their
prediction, they also relied on a skewed sample of the relevant commentary and
ignored the lengthening line of pertinent court decisions, which already represent
their only qualifier--"direct challenge[s] to the Rowley standard." Id. at 10. In
advocating an elevated standard, in contrast to their fused description of what the
courts "will" do, Huefner distinguishably demarcated what the courts "should" do.
Dixie Snow Huefner, Updating the FAPE Standard Under the IDEA, 37 J.L. &
EDUC. 367, 377 & 379 (2008); see also HUEFNER, supra note 19, at 252-32 (2006)
("speculat[ing]" that courts "may be more inclined" to be more rigorous with
regard to FAPE).
28. Tara L. Eyer, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments
Raise the Basic Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 126 EDUC. L.
REP. 1, 17 (1998).
foundation underlining Rowley's reasoning is no longer present."
29
More specifically, he prescribed a heightened substantive standard
for FAPE based on the shift from mere access to high expectations
and from process to standards-based outcomes in: (a) the standards-
based movement culminating in the NCLB; (b) the educational
adequacy school finance litigation based on state constitutions; and
(c) the emphasis on high expectations and standards in the 1997
reauthorization of IDEA.
On the more tempered side, the subsequent legal commentaries
have directed their prescriptions to revising IDEA legislation and
regulations. First, in the immediate wake of IDEA's 2004
amendments, Blau proposed "a more stringent educational standard
for disabled students" for the subsequent regulations.3" She pointed
to the preamble of IDEA 2004, which stresses the importance of
improved educational outcomes for self-sufficiency of individuals
with disabilities and which incorporates the "adequate yearly
progress" (AYP) accountability provision of the NCLB. She further
argued, "methodological considerations make a substantial difference
in the rate or even ability of a child with disabilities to learn what is
clearly prerequisite to self-sufficiency as currently mandated within
the Act.",31 At the same time, however, expressly acknowledging
that Congress had not changed the definition of FAPE and implicitly
recognizing that courts would not do so on their own, she made clear
that her advocacy was for the USDE to do so in the final regulations
for IDEA 2004. However, her message was too little, too late,
because the 2006 regulations left the definition of FAPE
unchanged.32
Calling instead for revisions at the congressional level, rather
than the USDE level, Daniel and Meinhardt characterized IDEA
29. Scott F. Johnson, Reexamining Rowley: A New Focus in Special Education
Law, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 561, 586. Johnson is an attorney "representing
parents and students in educational matters", available at
http://www.harborhouselaw.com/articles/rowley.reexamine.j ohnson.htm.
30. Blau, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
31. Id. at 18.
32. Additionally, missing the intervening pertinent case law, she also failed to
acknowledge the limited scope of authority of the USDE in adopting regulations
and entirely missed the only statutory basis for a heightened standard, which was
the new statutory standard for specially designed instruction in the IEP provision.
See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
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2004 as heightening the outcomes-oriented standard of IDEA 1997
"by incorporating even more language about high expectations in
state educational standards into the programming for students with
disabilities."33 Recognizing that intervening court decisions3 4 have
rejected such NCLB-based claims, they called for future IDEA
amendments to revise the Rowley Court's "minimalist
interpretation. 3 5  In contrast to Eyer and Johnson, respectively,
Daniel and Meinhardt only went so far as to conclude that the Rowley
standard "may be outdated" and cautioned that "the extent .. .
remains ambiguous and should be addressed in future legislation."36
III. RESULTING CASE LAW
It is the courts' interpretation, however, not the commentators'
interpretation of IDEA's language that ultimately counts, and with
limited exception, the long and wide line of court decisions has
continued to apply Rowley's substantive standard for FAPE, most of
them without even acknowledging, much less accepting, the
aforementioned arguments.
The first limited exception 37 is the federal district court's
decision, currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, 38 in J.L. v. Mercer
Island School District.39 The court did not rely on the NCLB or
IDEA 2004. Instead, in this case, which concerned three successive
IEPs before the effective date of IDEA 2004, the court based its
analysis on selected aspects of IDEA 1997 and its 1999 regulations.
More specifically, the court concluded that the emphasis on self-
sufficiency in IDEA 1997's preamble and legislative history in
33. Daniel & Meinhardt, supra note 17, at 531.
34. They identified the Fisher and Leighty decisions. For an overview of these
decisions, see infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
35. Daniel & Meinhardt, supra note 17, at 531.
36. Id. at 535.
37. The additional, more recent limited exception arose in the wake of other
IDEA language. See infra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
38. C. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Unit No. 6, 538 F. Supp. 2d 298, 300 n.4 (D. Me.
2008).
39. 46 IDELR 273 (W.D. Wash. 2006), further proceedings, 47 IDELR
120 (W.D. Wash. 2007). In the subsequent proceeding, after remand to the hearing
officer, the court awarded the parents three years of tuition reimbursement, with the
third year being in the form of compensatory education.
combination with its outcomes-oriented definition of transition
services represented a significant shift upward in the Rowley benefit
standard. Alternatively, referring to "statutory and regulatory
language, 4 °  the court viewed the absence of a specified
methodology in the IEPs' statement of specially designed instruction
as an additional failure to provide FAPE.
For several reasons, the J.L. exception thus far, subject to its
appeal, appears to be an isolated outlier. First, this federal trial court
decision in the state of Washington was not officially published, and
it has not been cited or followed in subsequent court decisions. The
second reason is that the court's reasoning is readily criticizable.
More specifically, it failed to take into account that the Rowley Court
had rejected the substantive standard of self-sufficiency despite
corresponding evidence of congressional intent, observing:
"[b]ecause many mildly handicapped children will achieve self-
sufficiency without state assistance while personal independence for
the severely handicapped may be an unreachable goal, 'self-
sufficiency' as a substantive standard is at once an inadequate
protection and an overly demanding one."41 The court's reasoning in
J.L. also failed to recognize the prevailing judicial view that if it
intended to change the substantive standard, Congress should have
been clear and specific in doing so in the FAPE provisions of IDEA,
given: (a) its awareness of Rowley and its extensive lower court
progeny, and (b) the funding, or Constitutional spending clause,
nature of IDEA. Similarly, the J.L. court's alternate methodology
rationale was based on the 2006 IDEA regulations' commentary,
which does not equate to regulatory language and is not entitled to
the binding force of the legislation or regulations.42 Moreover, the
court treated the cited agency interpretation as if it were an
unqualified requirement, whereas the 2006 commentary reiterated
"the Department's longstanding position on including instructional
methodologies in a child's IEP," which is that this matter is within
the IEP team's discretion.4 3
40.46 IDELR at *1188.
41. Rowley, 176 U.S. at 200 n.23.
42. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Do OSEP Policy Letters Have Legal Weight?,
171 EDUc. L. REP. 391 (2003).
43. IDEA Final Regulations Commentary, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,665 (Aug.
14, 2006) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300 and 301) (stating "if an IEP Team
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On the other hand, the prevailing side of authority is a
lengthening line of court decisions before and after the July 1, 2005
effective date of IDEA 2004 that have expressly rejected similar
claims, including those based on tie-ins with the NCLB.
One strand of these cases disposed of the NCLB-based argument.
In the first case, the parents' claimed, on behalf of their child with a
specific learning disability, that the IEP failed to include a research-
based reading program.44 The federal trial court in Pennsylvania
made short shrift of this claim, pointing out that-unlike the
NCLB-IDEA and the precedents at that time lacked any such
requirement. Next, in a 2006 decision, the federal district court in
West Virginia summarily rejected the parents' contention that the
NCLB's provisions for states to adopt "challenging academic content
standards and challenging student achievement standards" applied to
IDEA's requirement for school districts to provide FAPE to
individually eligible children. 45 Soon thereafter, in a federal district
court decision in Pennsylvania, the parents asserted that NCLB's
provisions for AYP changed the IDEA standard for FAPE to focus
on the child's results on the statewide standardized testing for AYP.46
Citing the preceding decision in West Virginia, the court disagreed,
concluding that neither the NCLB's provisions for state coordination
with IDEA nor IDEA's provisions for assessments provided the
requisite unambiguous change in the standard for FAPE warranted by
statutes enacted under the Constitution's spending clause. In a
subsequent decision in New Jersey, the federal district court similarly
rejected a parallel NCLB-based IDEA claim, additionally pointing
out the continuing consistent line of case law concerning the
substantive standard of FAPE between the passage of the NCLB and
IDEA 2004. 4' Next, a federal district court in Florida summarily
rejected the argument that the NCLB elevated the standard for FAPE
under IDEA.48 Finally, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling
determines that specific instructional methods are necessary for the child to receive
FAPE, the instructional methods may be addressed in the IEP").
44. Robert B. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 44 IDELR 123 (E.D. Pa.
2005).
45. Kirby v. Cabell County Bd. of Educ., 46 IDELR 156 (S.D. W. Va. 2006).
46. Leighty v. Laurel Sch. Dist., 457 F. Supp. 2d 546 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
47. Fisher v. Stafford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 47 IDELR 134 (D. N.J. 2007).
48. Sch. Bd. v. M.M., 47 IDELR 220 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
that the NCLB supersedes IDEA to any extent that it conflicts with
IDEA's pre-existing FAPE requirement provides only tangential
support. 49 The reason, as the court explained, is, "Plaintiffs do not
contend that any of the amendments made in 2004 supersedes any
aspect of the [NCLB] that matters to this litigation. To the contrary,
the 2004 amendments were designed in part to conform the [IDEA]
to the 2001 Act, not to displace it."50
The other strand of cases, standing in contrast to J.L., disposed of
the IDEA-based arguments and adhered to the Rowley standard. The
first and much longer segment of this strand roundly rejected the
argument that various broad provisions in IDEA 1997 supplanted the
Rowley standard."1 Within the smaller window of cases based on
triggering facts after July 1, 2005, a recent published federal district
court decision similarly rebuffed the argument that the new and more
ambitious preamble of IDEA 2004 heightened the Rowley standard.
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The court reasoned that "given the ubiquity of Rowley," Congress'
failure to amend the statutory definition of FAPE outweighed the
purported effect of the "commendable language" in the preamble.53
49. Bd. of Educ. v. Spellings, 517 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2008).
50. Id. at 926.
51. Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1149-51 (10th Cir.
2008) (self-sufficiency); Lessard v. Wilton Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist., 518
F.3d 18, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2008) (transition); Lt. T.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361
F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2004) (teacher training); San Rafael Elementary Sch. Dist. v.
Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(transition and teacher training). In the more recent of the two First Circuit
decisions, the court specifically rejected the J.L. reasoning as "unconvincing."
Lessard, 518 F.3d at 28 n.5. Moreover, the court unusually reasoned as follows:
School districts, like parents and children, have legal rights with
respect to special education. In demanding more than the IDEA
requires, the appellants frustrated the operation of a collaborative
process and put the School District in an untenable position.
Id. at 30.
52. Mr. C. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Unit No. 6, 538 F. Supp. 2d 298, 301 (D. Me.
2008).
53. Id.
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IV. PRR: THE MISSING STATUTORY LINK?
In contrast with most of the commentary 54 and the foregoing case
law, the more likely lever already available for a judicially construed
elevation of the substantive standard for FAPE is the particularly
pertinent 55 but conditional requirement in IDEA 2004, that the IEP's
specification of specially designed instruction and related services be
based on "peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable. 56 As
explained in a recent analysis, 57 SBR and PRR in IDEA are like two
overlapping ovals; SBR must be, among other things, PRR, but PRR
need not be SBR.58 More specifically, in this context PRR refers to
one element in the NCLB definition of SBR, which the IDEA
regulations incorporate by reference. 59  The specific element
provides that the study "has been accepted by a peer-reviewed
journal or approved by a panel of independent experts through a
54. Yell, Katsiyannis & Hazelkorn, supra note 27, at 9, were among the few
commentators who mentioned the PRR provision in IDEA 2004, but they
categorically concluded that this "new requirement will result and stronger and
more effective programs for students with disabilities in special education." For a
more legally tempered view, see Barbara Bateman, Law and the Conceptual
Foundations of Special Education Practice, in ACHIEVING THE RADICAL REFORM
OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 95, 102 (Jean B. Crockett, Michael M. Gerber & Timothy
Landrum eds., 2007) (commenting on PRR that "[i]t remains to be seen whether
this legal provision will be enthusiastically implemented and/or rigorously
enforced"); see also BARBARA BATEMAN & MARY ANNE LINDEN, BETTER IEPs 63
(2006) (characterizing PRR as "one of the potentially most significant changes
made to IDEA").
55. This language is particularly pertinent because, unlike the preamble, it
directly defines FAPE in terms of its integral and central element of special
education or specially designed instruction.
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (LEXIS 2008).
57. Perry A. Zirkel & Tessie Rose, SBR and PRR under the IDEA: Legal
Definitions, Applications, and Implications (2008) (manuscript under review for
publication, on file with the author).
58. As shown in a recent simplifying piece, which includes a Venn diagram,
SBR includes PRR as one element along with more restrictive criteria oriented to
experimental and quasi-experimental research. PRR extends beyond PRR to
various other forms of research, including correlational and qualitative research,
which has successfully passed through this expert-panel process. Perry A. Zirkel,
A Legal Roadmap of SBR, PRR, and Related Terms under the IDEA, 40 FOCUS ON
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 1 (Jan. 2008).
59. 34 C.F.R. § 300.35 (2007).
comparably rigorous, objective, and scientific review. ' 6°  In its
commentary accompanying the regulations, the USDE explained its
decision not to include a specific definition of PRR in the final
regulations, reasoning that although PRR
generally refers to research that is reviewed by
qualified and independent reviewers to ensure that the
quality of the information meets the standards of the
field before the research is published ... there is no
single definition of "Peer Reviewed Research"
because the review process varies depending on the
type of information to be reviewed.6'
Additionally, USDE rejected suggestions to accept other terms as
PRR, explaining: "[t]he Act does not refer to 'evidence-based
practices' or 'emerging best practices,' which are generally terms of
art that may or may not be based on [PRR]." 62  Finally, the
qualifying, or conditional, language of "to the extent practicable," in
the circumspect interpretation of USDE, "means that services and
supports should be based on [PRR] to the extent that it is possible,
given the availability of [PRR]"63
V. PRR CASE LAW
Thus far, the emerging case law is largely limited to two
opposing interpretations, first at the hearing officer level, and then at
the federal district court level in California and Iowa, respectively.
60. 20 U.S.C. § 7801(37) (2002).
61.71 Fed. Reg. at 46,664.
62. Id. at 46,664.
63. Id. at 46,665. OSEP added:
States, school districts, and school personnel must, therefore,
select and use methods that research has shown to be effective, to
the extent that methods based on [PRR] are available. This does
not mean that the service with the greatest body of research is ...
necessarily required for a child to receive FAPE. Likewise, there
is nothing in the Act to suggest that the failure of a [district] to
provide services based on [PRR] would automatically result in a
denial of FAPE. Id.
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The limited California case law represents the conservative legal
view. Specifically, in a California case concerning whether a
particular district had provided FAPE to a six-year-old with autism,
the pertinent issue was whether the district's eclectic approach, which
included applied behavioral analysis (ABA), was appropriate as
compared with the parents' proposed ABA-only method. 4
Providing an extensive citation of the IDEA Final Regulations
Commentary, the hearing officer, who is a full-time administrative
law judge, upheld the district's IEP with the following pertinent
reasoning:
[I]f the component parts of a plan are peer-reviewed,
then it follows that the sum of those parts should be
considered as peer-reviewed as well, particularly in
light of the moral, legal and ethical constraints that
prevent the truest form of scientific study from being
conducted. The ultimate test is not the degree to which
a methodology has been peer-reviewed, but rather,
whether the methodology chosen was believed by the
IEP team to be appropriate to meet the individual
needs of the child.65
Notably, the hearing officer did not cite peer-reviewed studies
supporting the component parts of the district's proposed TEACCH
64. The autism field is marked by controversy as to which methodologies are
appropriate, and ABA is one of the strict behavioralist approaches that autism
advocates appear to favor. See, e.g., ELENA GALLEGOS & JILL SCHALLENBERGER,
AUTISM METHODOLOGY CASES TO LIVE BY: LEGAL GUIDANCE FOR PRACTICAL
PROGRAM STRATEGIES (LRP Publications, 2008); see also Claire Choutka, Patricia
Doloughty, & Perry Zirkel, The "Discrete Trials" of ABA for Children with
Autism: The Outcome-Related Factors in the Case Law, 38 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 95
(2004); Susan Etscheidt, An Analysis of Legal Hearings and Cases Related to IEPs
for Children with Autism, 28 RES. & PRAC. FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE
DISABILITIES 51 (2003); Catherine Nelson & Dixie Snow Huefner, Young Children
with Autism: Judicial Responses to the Lovaas and Discrete Trial Training
Debates, 26 J. EARLY INTERVENTION 1 (2003).
65. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist. v. Student, 48 IDELR 234, at *1036 (Cal.
SEA 2007). Interestingly, the hearing officer attributed this reasoning to the expert
testimony of the school district's school psychologist. Id.
method,66 instead deferring to the testimony of the district's
personnel that this approach was research-based and finding that the
three studies relied on by the parents' experts represented a narrow,
minority point of view in the current, inconclusive literature.
Without additionally resorting to the precedents regarding the need
for clear notice for enforcement of changes in legislation under the
Constitution's spending clause, the hearing officer also rejected the
parents' reliance on the J.L. v. Mercer Island School District
decision, reasoning: "The judicial interpretation given to a phrase is
presumed correct where Congress, with full knowledge of the judicial
interpretation, reenacts the phrase without changing it. . . . If
Congress had intended to overturn Rowley, it would have said so." 67
While this case was on appeal, three other hearing officer decisions
in California upheld the district's eclectic programs for other
individual students with autism. 68 The hearing officers-who are
part of the same system of full-time administrative law judges--cited
Rocklin or, in the most recent of the two cases, the IDEA Final
Regulations Commentary, for the proposition that the IDEA's PRR
provision does not necessarily require a particular program or
service. Then, in an unpublished decision, the federal district court
sided with the Rocklin hearing officer, reasoning much more
concisely as follows:
It does not appear that Congress intended that the
service with the greatest body of research be used in
order to provide FAPE. Likewise there is nothing in
the Act to suggest that the failure of a public agency to
provide services based on [PRR] would automatically
result in a denial of FAPE. As other Ninth Circuit
66. Project TEACCH is an eclectic, school-based model developed and
disseminated by the University of North Carolina. For an overview of the case law
concerning TEACCH and competing methodologies, see, e.g., GALLEGOS &
SCHALLENBERGER, supra note 64.
67. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist. v. Student, 48 IDELR at * 1034.
68. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR 210 (Cal. SEA 2008);
Fremont Unified Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR 114 (Cal. SEA 2007); San Juan Unified
Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR 201 (Cal. SEA 2007).
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courts have noted, if Congress intended to modify the
Rowley standard, it would have said SO. 69
An Iowa case represents, at least at the hearing officer stage, a
dramatically different approach. In Waukee Community School
District, a hearing officer in Iowa, who is a special education
professor, concluded in relevant part of this decision, that the
district's behavioral interventions with the child, an eight-year-old
with autism, violated the IDEA IEP requirement with regard to
PRR. 70 This part of her decision is remarkable in several respects.
First, the hearing started with the SBR-like conclusion that
"[p]rovisions in the IDEA 2004 require research-based
interventions; ' ,71 yet, all of the IDEA's references to SBR and its
variants-with the limited exception of the conditional PRR
requirement-do not apply to LEAs. 72 Second, the hearing officer
cited IDEA's legislative history to reach the interpretation that the
PRR provision requires empirical validation whenever possible,
whereas her cited support was the IDEA Regulations Commentary,
which is less specific than her interpretation and less strong than
legislative history. Third, as a responsible and knowledgeable
academician, the hearing officer cited various articles in the
professional literature that question the assumptions underlying
PRR.73 Fourth, the hearing officer determined the substantive
violation of FAPE by citing a whole host of studies published in
peer-reviewed journals such that the written opinion, in relevant part,
was more like a literature review article than a traditional legal
69. Joshua A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 49 IDELR 249, at * 1142 (E.D.
Cal. 2008) (citing San Rafael Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing
Office, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
70. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR 26 (Iowa SEA 2007). The hearing
officer also decided in the parents' favor on the grounds of least restrictive
environment and multiple prejudicial procedural violations. Id. The facts of the
case and the hearing officer's decision received national attention in a Wall Street
Journal article, but the article focused on the behavioral methods, not the PRR
provision. The article also reported that the parents had moved to California.
Robert Tomsho, When Discipline Starts a Fight, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2007, at Al.
71. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR at * 136.
72. Zirkel & Rose, supra note 57.
73. Waukee, at *143 nn. 16, 18 & 19.
decision. Finally, according to the defendants' attorney,74 one of the
bases of the appeal is that--despite the more than 1500 pages of
education research that the parties provided as exhibits in this ten-
session hearing-the hearing officer's citations included articles not
within the record of the case.
In a recent decision, a federal district court affirmed the hearing
officer's decision but largely ducked the PRR issue by folding it into
the Rowley standard.75 Specifically, the court concluded that the
hearing officer's delineation of criteria for behavioral interventions as
substantive rights constituted legal error, but that it was permissible
for her to "consider" these factors in applying Rowley. 76 Subordinate
to this conclusion, the court responded to the parents' citation of
IDEA's PRR provision as follows: "[a]n IEP which relies on
behavioral interventions which are not supported by, or are contrary
to, the relevant research may be such that it is not 'reasonably
calculated' to provide an educational benefit., 77 Applying this
merged use of PRR, the court concluded that the preponderance of
the evidence, with notable reliance on expert testimony and no
mention of the cited peer-reviewed studies, supported the hearing
officer's decision that the formulation and implementation of the
behavioral interventions fell short of the Rowley standard.78
VI. CONCLUSION
The interpretation and application of the qualified, or conditional,
PRR requirement in IDEA 2004 has implications for practice,
litigation, and policymaking in special education. As for practice,
school districts will need to train their members of the IEP team in
74. Telephone interview with Ronald L. Peeler, Partner, Ahlers & Cooney
(July 10, 2007).
75. D. L. v. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 51 IDELR 15 (S.D. Iowa 2008).
76. Id. at *90 n.20. Interestingly, the court reached this conclusion as a
harmonizing compromise in relation to the Seventh Circuit's treatment of a pre-
PRR decision by this same hearing officer. Compare Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley
Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603 (7th Cr. 2004), with Mason City Cmty. Sch.,
36 IDELR 50 (Iowa SEA 2001).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 25. The court also relied on LRE and one procedural violation for its
ultimate affirmance. Id. at *30-31.
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the qualified legal meaning and importance of PRR in specifying the
specially designed instruction and IEP for the eligible child. First,
although not precisely defining PRR, the aforementioned7 9 IDEA
regulations' commentary made relatively clear that this term is more
rigorous than "evidence-based" 80 and yet less rigorous than SBR.
However, as the promotion and tenure process in higher education
reveals, neither "peer reviewed" nor "research" necessarily means
objective and selective high quality. Second, if two competing
methodologies each have support in terms of PRR, this standard does
not necessarily mean that the better or best methodology is required.
Third, the individualization mandate of IDEA dictates against a one-
size-fits-all PRR selection of methodology or other FAPE options.
Finally and most significant legally, the applicable interpretation of
the PRR provision, including its thus far untested "to the extent
practicable" qualifier,8' will ultimately depend on the courts.
As for litigation, one of the possible significant contributing
factors to the applicable interpretation appears to be the professional
orientation of the adjudicator. The research to date is too limited to
determine the effect of this factor, 82 especially in light of the recency
and particularity of the PRR provision. Unlike the indirect language
in the prefatory findings or other broad-based features of IDEA, PRR
serves as a potential bridge for incorporating best practice into the
legal standard for FAPE. Hearing officers who have the training and
orientation in favor of best practice, as represented by research in
peer-reviewed periodicals and proceedings, may serve as the drivers
79. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
80. Most of the special education literature to date has not clearly
differentiated between PRR, SBR, and related terms such as "evidence based."
See, e.g., YELL, supra note 19, at 456 (characterizing PRR as SBR); Jean B.
Crockett & Mitchell L. Yell, Without Data All We Have Are Assumptions:
Revisiting the Meaning of a Free Appropriate Public Education, 37 J.L. & EDUC.
381, 387 (2008) (similarly confused PRR with SBR); cf. John W. Maag & Antonis
Katsiyannis, Pick and Choose, 3 PRINCIPAL LEADERSHIP 35 (Oct. 2003) (relying
without clear differentiation between statutory and professional standards at a time
after NCLB SBR but before IDEA PRR).
81. BATEMAN & LINDEN, supra note 54, at 63, predicted that this phrase "will
undoubtedly be at the center of many disputes."
82. See, e.g., James R. Newcomer, Perry A. Zirkel & Ralph J. Tarola,
Characteristics and Outcomes of Special Education Hearing and Review Officer
Cases, 123 EDUC. L. REP. 449 (1998).
across this bridge. Whether the hearing officers with a strictly legal
training and orientation, which are increasingly the norm under the
"judicializing" trend of hearings under the IDEA, 83 dominate the
initial traffic and whether the reviewing courts ultimately give a
green or red light to a FAPE-optimizing application of PRR,
including its "extent practicable" limitation, are open questions at this
point. The small sample thus far, which is limited to the hearing
officer and federal district court decisions in California and Iowa,
seem to suggest a conditional skew toward the minimizing effect of
PRR, depending on whether the hearing officer exhibited the
academic and advocacy orientation of special education
professionals. Even in the Iowa case, however, the court melded the
hearing officer's rigorous view of PRR into a potentially but not
necessarily outcome-determinative consideration of the still-
overriding Rowley standard.84 One of the important conditional
factors in the Iowa case was the role of expert witnesses. The PRR
provision appears to be at tension with two of the Supreme Court's
latest decisions that interpreted IDEA to put the burden of proof on
parents in FAPE cases 85 and-even more so given the court's Iowa
decision-to not provide the cost of experts to prevailing parents.
86
To the extent that parents use experts to prudently and efficiently
provide a record of PRR to counter the specially designed instruction
in the child's IEP or to cross examine the district's witnesses'
knowledge of PRR first as a concept distinguishable from SBR, or
other overlapping professional terminology, such as "evidence-
based" and second in its specific application to the FAPE in the IEP,
they are more likely to prevail, thereby stretching, if not superseding,
the Rowley standard.
However, depending on the parents' sophistication and the
hearing officer's orientation, there is enough latitude in the PRR
provision-as the district-deferential analysis of the cluster of
California hearing officer decisions, along with their single,
unpublished judicial appeal, tentatively illustrate-to leave the
83. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
84. In the Waukee case, the court relied on a series of cumulative PRR
considerations plus a procedural FAPE violation and an LRE violation. See supra
notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
85. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
86. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
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landscape largely unchanged in terms of the substantive standard for
FAPE. For the exacting law-oriented adjudicator, an additional legal
factor that may contribute to the status quo is considering whether the
new PRR provision is sufficiently clear to meet the spending clause
limitation that the Supreme Court recognized in Rowley, "if Congress
intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must
do so unambiguously," 87 that the Court reinforced in its IDEA
expert-fees opinion. 88
Finally, if the courts do not establish the predicted fundamental
elevation of the substantive standard for FAPE, the issue will revert
back to the policymaking branch of federal and state governments. 89
Congress and state legislatures have the ultimate choice to change the
standard from "the educational equivalent of a serviceable
Chevrolet" 90 to a Cadillac or to an even more sophisticated, research-
based vehicle, while considering the trade-offs not specific to the
more restricted scope of the judicial process, including resource
allocation for the corresponding costs to the public fisc. 9 1
Thus, whether the PRR provision realizes its potential of fusing
best practice-at least to the extent that it has the support of research
studies in peer-reviewed journals-with legal requirements, thereby
elevating the substantive standard of FAPE, is largely subject to
scholarly speculation. Based on comprehensive canvassing of the
87. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204 n.26.
88. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 548 U.S. at 296.
89. The focus here has been on the substantive side of FAPE. During the same
period, however, the Rowley progeny has largely taken a restrictive view of its
procedural measure of FAPE. In IDEA 2004 Congress codified this harmless-error
standard for procedural violation, with the limited exception of "[s]ignificantly
imped[ing] the parent's opportunity to participate in the decision-making process
regarding the provision of a [FAPE]." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E). The result,
which seems to be a rather minimalist interpretation of the Rowley rationale
regarding the procedural aside of FAPE, has reinforced the importance of the
substantive standard for FAPE. Indeed, an alternate way for adjudicative
minimization of the PRR provision is to consider it a procedural ingredient of the
IEP.
90. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459 (6th Cir. 1993).
91. Special education costs, on average, approximate twice that of regular
education; yet, Congress provides IDEA only about one-fifth of that differential.
See, e.g., Jay G. Chambers, Jenifer J. Harr & Amynah Dhanani, What Are We
Spending on Special Education Services in the United States, 1999-2000? (June
2004), available at http://CSEF-air.org/publications/seepnational/AdvRpt 1.pdf.
lengthening line of pertinent court decisions to date, such scholarly
commentary warrants clearly tempered circumspection. At this
preliminary point, the answer would appear that any change is more
likely than not to be within the current range of the Rowley progeny
rather than the significant, or superseding, elevation that some
commentators have advocated. Among the sub-questions that
abound are: (a) whether hearing officers and courts will confuse PRR
with the more rigorous legal definition of SBR; (b) whether, instead,
the "extent practicable" exception will dilute the substance of the
standard; (c) whether, if the new provision is indeed the missing link
for a heightened FAPE standard, peer review provides the high
standard of quality associated with the sciences and medicine; 92and
(d) whether hearing officers and courts will require parents to provide
the same PRR support for their advocated methodologies and
unilateral placements. 93
During this period of judicial settling, further USDE guidance, in
the form of policy letters, and-much more determinatively-the
next Congressional reauthorization may also enter the equation. In
the meantime, the PRR provision warrants the heightened attention of
commentators and practitioners well beyond the largely missing
consideration to date. Unless and until the next reauthorization
addresses the Rowley standard via refinement of the PRR provision
or the FAPE definition, hearing officers will be playing a
fundamental role in answering the question as to whether the IDEA
has already been amended to raze Rowley and its progeny with a
raised substantive standard.
92. For example, methodology for students with autism is one of the leading
sources of litigation relying on the substantive standard for FAPE; yet, the study
committee appointed by the National Research Council concluded that "[t]here is
no outcome study published in a peer-reviewed journal that supports comparative
statements of the superiority of one model or approach over another." NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH AUTISM 166 (2001).
93. Strictly speaking, the IDEA requirement for PRR is specific to the school
district's IEP, not the parents' proposal or, in tuition reimbursement cases (at step 2
of the Burlington-Carter analysis, which focuses on the appropriateness of the
parents' unilateral placement), actual alternative. However, school districts will
likely argue that the substantive standard should be a two-way street. Such an
argument was largely unsuccessful in Florence County School District Four v.
Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), but the specific application to PRR is an open question.
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